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DnCrs iN CIAirrn
sold a sixteen-foot
extension ladder manufactured by another to X, who, without having used the ladder in an extended position, loaned the ladder to P.
P suffered injuries when the upper right rail broke while he was
standing on the second rung from the top. The defect was a latent
one. Held, under local law the seller of a chattel manufactured by
TORTS-WARRANTY OF VENDOR FOR LATENT

MAUrFACrumED BY Trinm

PERSON-D, a retailer,

another, who has no reason to know of any dangerous condition of
the chattel, is not liable for harm caused by such condition even

though he might have discovered the defect by an inspection or
test before selling it. Burgess v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc.,
264 F.2d 495 (10th Cir. 1959).
It is not readily determinable from a reading of the principal
case -the form of action under which it was brought. The court

said that it was unnecessary to consider the rather nebulous distinctions between recovering on a theory of negligence and on a
theory of a breach of an implied warranty, since any breach of
warranty in such a situation would be caused by negligence. This
is a rather strong statement and may be subject to some question,
but it is apparent that the plaintiff in this case could not have
recovered from the vendor under any theory. In order to recover
for negligence, the plaintiff would have to show a breach of a duty
of inspection on the part of the defendant, and it has been held
that vendors who are not the manufacturers of an article have no

duty to inspect that article for latent defects. Zesch v. Abrasivel
Co. of Philadelphia,353 Mo. 558, 183 S.W.2d 140 (1944). A retailer of goods has a duty only to inform a buyer of defects of
which he, the retailer, knows or has reason to know. Bergstresserv.
Van iHoy, 142 Kan. 88, 45 P.2d 855 (1935). In the principal case
the plaintiff would have his remedy against the manufacturer. The

noted case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111
N.E. 1050 (1916), established the principle that a manufacturer is
liable for injuries to remote vendees or users of his chattels which
are inherently dangerous or rendered so by the defect, despite the
lack of privity of contract. Decisions subsequent to the MacPherson
case have generally allowed recovery on a theory of negligence and
not on implied warranties. Carterv. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92,
64 N.E.2d 693 (1946).
Since the precise question presented in the principal case has
never been considered in West Virginia, an examination of cases
relating to implied warranties might be beneficial.
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First it is convenient to consider a brief definition of an implied warranty and its purpose. In Bekkvold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87,
216 N.W. 790 (1927), the court stated that an implied warranty is
not an element of a contract. It need not be stated in the contract
and its application or very existence does not depend on any affirmative intent of the parties. Because of the acts and relationship of the parties to each other, an implied warranty is imposed
by the law; it is an obligation which arises outside of the contract.
The use of the concept of implied warranties is to promote and
maintain high business standards and to prevent sharp dealings.
One of the early West Virginia cases in which the court
examined the principles of implied warranties was Hood v. Bloch,
29 W. Va. 244, 11 S.E. 910 (1886). This was an action of assumpsit
by A for the price of cheese which he had sold to B. B, who had
no opportunity for inspection, received cheese of a much poorer
quality than that which he had ordered, and defended the action
on the theory that the vendor had impliedly warranted the merchantability of the cheese. In holding in B's favor, the West Virginia
court cited extensively from the English case of Jones v. just, L.R. 8
Q.B. 197 (1868), which held, in part, that where goods are in existence and may be inspected by the buyer and there is no fraud on
the part of the seller, the doctrine of caveat emptor applies. This
was held to be the rule, at least where the seller was neither the
manufacturer nor the grower. The West Virginia court thought this
to be a very logical and well reasoned opinion, although, as can be
seen from the factual situation of the case then under consideration, the adoption of these views was not necessary to the ultimate
decision of the case and was dicta. Still this excellent opinion would
likely be given consideration by our court in reaching a decision
on the subject today.
Another West Virginia case which adds to the belief that the
courts of West Virginia would be in accord with the principal
case is Watkins v. Angotti, 65 W. Va. 193, 63 S.E. 969 (1908),
which held that where there was a sale of a definite chattel, specifically described, the actual condition of which could be determined by either party by a thorough inspection, there were no
implied warranties of merchantibility. See also Lambert v. Armentrout, 65 W. Va. 375, 64 S.E. 260 (1908).
The doctrine of caveat emptor, as mentioned in Hood v. Bloch,
supra, is exceedingly harsh and has been modified and riddled by
exceptions in later cases because of the needs of a modem com-
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mercial society. One exception to the doctrine has been recognized
where a buyer makes known his needs to the seller and relies on
the judgment of the seller to supply the article which will best
suit his purpose. Pennington v. Cranberry Fuel Co., 117 W. Va.i
680, 1.86 S.E. 610 (1936); Schaffner v. National Supply Co., 80
W. Va. 111, 92 S.E. 580 (1917). Save for this exception, the principles stated in Jones v. Just, supra,were again followed in Schaffner
v. National Supply Co., supra. An earlier West Virginia case, Erie
City Iron Works v. Miller Supply Co., 68 W. Va. 519, 70 S.E. 125
(1910), is apparently in conflict with the exception stated above,
but it is felt that Pennington v. Cranberry Fuel Co., supra, represents the more acceptable view. However, there is nothing in these
cases to intimate that West Virginia would reach a result contra to
the principal case.
A study of authorities from other jurisdictions further supports
the belief that the result reached in the principal case was completely justifiable. In Zesch v. Abrasive Co. of Philadelphia,supra,
an action was brought by an employee of the purchaser against the
manufacturer and the seller of an abrasive cutting-off wheel for
injuries sustained by him when the defective wheel disintegrated.
The vendor could not have discovered the defect by an exterior
inspection. The court held that the vendor had no duty under
these facts to subject the wheel to any rigid tests or inspections for
latent defects, since the wheel was manufactured by another. The
court went even further and said that absent any showing that the
purchaser had requested the vendor to furnish the wheel for a
particular purpose, there was no implied warranty of fitness attached to the wheel. See also King Hardware Co. v. Ennis, 89 Ga.
App. 355, 147 S.E. 119 (1929).
Recovery for personal injuries from the use of ordinary merchandise under the theory of implied warranties has been denied
in a number of cases from other jurisdictions. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., v. Markenke, 121 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1941); Terrell v. Florence,
53 Ga. App. 354, 185 S.E. 839 (1936); Crandall v. Stop & Shop,
288 Ill. App. 548, 6 N.E.2d 685 (1937); Kratz v. American Stores
Co., &'59 Pa. 335, 59 A.2d 138 (1948).
The Virginia court considered a case with a similar factual
situation in Belcher v. Goff Bros., 145 Va. 448, 134 S.E. 588 (1926).
In this case G conducted a small retail business in a little Virginia
township. G carried a variety of goods, including coal oil or kerosene, which it bought from a West Virginia firm. G had sold this
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kerosene for several years, and no one had ever complained about
it. Y bought some of the oil which had been adulterated by gasoline and she was severly injured when it exploded. In an excellantly written opinion, the Virginia court considered numerous
authorities on the subject and reached the conclusion that where
the vendor is not the manufacturer and the purchaser knows or
should know this, then the vendor is not responsible for latent
defects on the theory of implied warranty. Accord, Universal
Motors Co. v. Snow, 149 Va. 690, 140 S. E. 653 (1927).
The above decisions have a firm foundation. Any other results would have been inequitable and undesirable, defeating the
very reason for the existence of implied warranties. As was so ably
pointed out in Ellis v. Montgomery & Crawford, Inc., 189 S.C. 72,
200 S.E. 82 (1938), a rule contra to the one in the principal case
would make retailers of the simplest and most common household
and other goods absolute insurers of the infallibility of all those
in the manufacturing process, from the raw-material suppliers to
middlemen handling the finished product which he re-sells to the
ultimate consumer.
L. O. H.
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DEFzmNA.-A diamond broker having committed suicide,

his personal representative brought an action against two diamond
dealers to recover under N.Y. Decedent Estate Law § 130. Ds had
allegedly obtained a diamond from deceased upon the agreement
that they would return the stone or give compensation therefor upon
demand. Decedent had received the diamond from a wholesaler
on the same terms. When decedent called for the diamond, Ds
refused to return it or to pay for it, thereby intentionally threatening the broker's reputation and livelihood. P alleged that Ds' wilful
act induced in the broker an irresistible impulse to take his own
life. Held, denying motion to dismiss the cause of action, that where
it was alleged that malicious and intentional conversion of a consigned diamond induced in the deceased an irresistible impulse to
take his own life, and that he did so, recovery could be had for the
death of deceased caused by Ds' wrongful act. Cauverien v. De
Metz, 188 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1959).
The principal case represents the latest stage in the evolution
of a rule of law that has been three quarters of a century in the
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